Showing posts with label Iowa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iowa. Show all posts

Thursday, August 25, 2011

SCHNEIDERMAN REMOVED BY TOM MILLER FROM THE 50-STATE COALITION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE NATION'S FIVE BIGGEST SERVICERS. I AM FURIOUS. THE STRONGEST ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE COALITION HAS BEEN REMOVED BY THE SERVICER'S DIRECTED LEAD NEGOTIATOR. THANKS A LOT TOM MILLER. WE'LL SEE IF YOU GET RE-ELECTED.


Schneiderman Accused
Of Undermining AG-Bank Negotiations




IN NEWS > MORTGAGE SERVICING
BY MORTGAGEORB.COM ON WEDNESDAY 24 AUGUST 2011
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New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
has been removed from the executive committee
responsible for steering negotiations between
the 50-state coalition of attorneys general and
the nation's five biggest servicers, the
Washington Postreports.

In a statement provided to the Post, the lead negotiator
in the settlement talks, Iowa AG Tom Miller (pictured left),
accused Schneiderman of undermining negotiations. The Post
reports that Iowa Assistant AG Patrick Madigan alerted
other state officials of the decision by email Tuesday afternoon.

Schneiderman, who is currently investigating banks’
mortgage securitization activities, has objected to any
broad settlement that would release the banks from
liability relating to mortgage issues apart from flawed
servicing. Over the weekend, several news outlets
 reported that federal and state officials, including
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary Shaun Donovan, have pressured Schneiderman
to soften his position. Other state AGs, including those
from Nevada and Massachusetts, have similarly
expressed concerns over any settlement that would
shield banks from future litigation.

In his statement Tuesday, Miller said Schneiderman
had declined to join a “negotiation committee” in June.

“Since that time, New York has actively worked to
undermine the very same multistate group that it
had spent the previous nine months working very
closely with,” Miller said. “While we certainly respect
the right of any state to choose to no longer participate
in a multistate and to pursue another path, working to
actively undermine a multistate while still a member
of the executive committee simply doesn’t make sense,
is unprecedented and is unacceptable.”

Schneiderman spokesperson Danny Kanner said in a
statement that “ongoing investigations by attorneys
general cannot be shut down by efforts to settle
quickly,” the Post reports.


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Saturday, July 16, 2011

WELLS FARGO, LYING THEN, OR NOW? LOST NOTE AFFIDAVIT DOESN'T CUT IT.

LOST NOTE AFFIDAVIT GOES DOWN IN FLAMES IN IOWA

MOST POPULAR ARTICLES

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEFEATED IN IOWA; TWO SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS IN NEVADA
July 14, 2011, 2 hours ago | Jeff Barnes
July 14, 2011
An Iowa District Court has issued a 5-page Order denying Wells Fargo’s
(second) Motion for Summary Judgment. Wells Fargo had originally been
granted summary judgment against the borrower, who was pro se at the
time, in 2005 based upon a sworn affidavit that Wells Fargo was the
holder of the note. The borrower had filed an affidavit which stated
that she had spoken to Wells Fargo and was told that the “investor” on
her loan was Lehman. The case languished in an appellate posture and
was continued for various reasons.
Jeff Barnes, Esq. began representing the borrower in early 2010 with
local Iowa counsel Christine Sand, Esq., who immediately initiated
extensive discovery. The Court ordered Wells Fargo to submit an
original of the Note by July 20, 2010. The next day (after the time
for compliance with the Court’s Order had already passed), Wells Fargo
filed a Motion for additional time to comply with the Order, and a
Motion to Substitute Plaintiff which stated that pursuant to a
servicing agreement between Wells Fargo and Lehman Brothers Bank FSB
that the holder of the note and mortgage was Lehman. The 2005 summary
judgment was thus vacated.
Wells Fargo filed a “lost note affidavit” a month later on August 20,
2010 which the Court found did not disclose the specific facts in the
“record of account” which was reviewed by the Wells Fargo affiant upon
which she based her conclusion. On February 23, 2011, Wells Fargo
filed an Amended Foreclosure Petition alleging that Wells Fargo was
the owner and holder of the note and that Lehman Brothers Bank, Lehman
Brothers Holdings, and a securitized mortgage loan trust of which US
Bank was the “trustee” were added “for the purposes of quieting title
to subject property and to comply with” Iowa statutory law. The court
noted that it was unclear what form of relief was being sought with
the addition of these parties.
Wells Fargo filed another affidavit executed by the same Wells Fargo
affiant who executed the “lost note” affidavit. This “new” affidavit
stated that the original note and mortgage were sent to Wells Fargo’s
prior counsel in November 2004 and were lost while in the custody of
said counsel. The Court again found that the affiant did not state the
facts upon which the affiant relied for her conclusions nor what parts
of the file she reviewed upon which she relied.
In its Reply to the borrower’s opposition (which is termed
“Resistance” in Iowa) to Wells Fargo’s second Motion for Summary
Judgment, Wells Fargo attached a copy of a lost note affidavit which
the Court stated was “purportedly” executed by Wells Fargo’s attorney
in 2005. Wells Fargo’s current counsel represented to the Court in its
Reply that Wells Fargo’s previous counsel filed a lost note affidavit
on March 28, 2005. The Court stated that it had reviewed both the
docket sheet and the court file and found no evidence that the
original of the alleged 2005 lost note affidavit was ever filed.
Based on these matters, the Court found that there were factual issues
as to whether or not the note has been lost and whether the note has
been “transferred”, and denied summary judgment to Wells Fargo on its
foreclosure claim.
Our question to Wells Fargo is, were you lying then or are you lying
now? Round and around and around we go, and where Wells Fargo and its
attorneys will stop, nobody knows! Note, note, who has the note?
Lehman? Lehman Holdings? The USBank securitization? None of the above?
Separately, the Supreme Court of Nevada issued two opinions on July 7,
2011 which finally compel foreclosing parties in Nevada to produce
material documentation as to chain of title to the Note and Deed of
Trust in order to be permitted to continue with a foreclosure action
when mediation is requested. in Leyva v. National Default Servicing et
al., No. 55216, 127 Nev. Advance Opinion 40, the Supreme Court held
that strict compliance is required with Nevada statutes governing the
production of certain documents including any assignment of the Deed
of Trust; that a foreclosing party’s failure to do so “is a
sanctionable offense; and the district court is prohibited from
allowing the foreclosure process to proceed”. Wells Fargo was also the
culprit in this case.
Significantly, in discussing the transfer of the Note, the Supreme
Court of Nevada cited to the recent In Re Veal decision from the 9th
Circuit Bankruptcy Appeals Panel (which was previously discussed on
this website), holding that the borrower “has the right to know the
identity of the entity that is ‘entitled to enforce’ the mortgage note
under Article 3 (of the Uniform Commercial Code).” The Court concluded
that Article 3 “clearly requires Wells Fargo to demonstrate more than
mere possession of the original note to be able to enforce a
negotiable instrument”. The court found that there was no endorsement
and no assignment, and reversed the District Court.
The opinion in Leyva cited to the Court’s opinion in Pasillas v. HSBC
Bank as Trustee, No. 56393, 127 Nev. Advance Opinion 39 (also decided
July 7, 2011), which also reversed the District Court and also cited
to Veal , setting forth the requirements for production of evidence of
chain of title to the note and Deed of Trust in a foreclosure.
The multiple citations to Veal, which is a Federal Bankruptcy
appellate court opinion, by the state Supreme Court of Nevada, is more
than important. It demonstrates that simply because a foreclosure
issue is decided by a Bankruptcy court does not mean that it is not
applicable to a non-Bankruptcy (or non-Federal) foreclosure case. Time
and again, when we argue that an issue in a state foreclosure case has
already been decided by a Bankruptcy court in the foreclosure context,
attorneys representing foreclosing “lenders” and servicers argue
“Well, Judge, that was a Bankruptcy case, and we are not in Bankruptcy
Court”. Leyva and Pasillas have now put that argument to bed. If a
Federal Bankruptcy decision is good enough for the Supreme Court of
Nevada in two separate opinions, it should be good enough for any
state court.
We thank one of our dedicated readers for alerting us to these two
highly significant Nevada decisions.
Jeff Barnes, Esq., www.ForeclosureDefensenationwide.com
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One Response

  1. Thank you Neil for again calling attention to these matters, my own court case continues to grow. I forgot a number of things, and repetition is KEY…..Thank You.

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Saturday, March 19, 2011

WHY IS IOWA'S ATTORNEY GENERAL HELPING CITIBANK IN THIS CASE? SOMEONE HELP ME HERE, WHAT AM I MISSING?


IOWA Appeals Court
Declares Mortgage VOID 
Under IA Code Sec. 561.13 
CITIMORTGAGE, INC. v. Danielson

Posted on18 March 2011. Tags: citimortgage, closing, foreclosure fraud, free and clear house, homestead, Iowa Section 561.13, Jamie Danielson, Judge Doyle, Matthew D. Danielson, void

Read about this more HERE. Thanks for the Tip
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW D. DANIELSON a/k/a MATTHEW DANIELSON and JAMIE DANIELSON, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 9-194/08-1473

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed May 29, 2009.

Mollie Pawlosky and Jon P. Sullivan of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., Des Moines; Theodore R. Boecker of Petosa, Petosa & Boecker, L.L.P., Clive; and Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.[Editors Note: Why is Iowa's Attorney General's Office helping Citibank?]

Jerrold Wanek of Garten & Wanek, Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.

DOYLE, J.

Citimortgage, Inc. appeals from a district court ruling declaring the real estate mortgage it held on property owned by Matthew Danielson to be void under Iowa Code section 561.13 (2007). We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In late April 2007, Matthew Danielson entered into an agreement to purchase a newly constructed home in Ankeny for $320,228. Matthew and his wife, Jamie, met with their real estate agent, the builder, and the builder’s real estate agent on several occasions and walked through the home together multiple times before deciding to purchase it. The purchase agreement was contingent upon Matthew obtaining financing for one hundred percent of the purchase price at or below seven percent interest. A closing date of May 10, 2007, was set.

Because Jamie’s credit was poor, Matthew decided to apply for a loan on his own. He contacted mortgage broker Jason Larson, who was employed by One Source Mortgage, Inc., for assistance in securing a loan. Matthew knew Larson because their children attended the same daycare. Larson arranged for Matthew to obtain a loan through Citimortgage and retained attorney David Pulliam to act as the closing agent. In anticipation of the closing, an attorney for the builder’s real estate agent prepared a warranty deed conveying title in the property to Matthew as “a married person.” The deed was later changed by someone else to refer to Matthew as “an unmarried person.”

The closing date was pushed back several times. Finally, on May 24, 2007, Larson called Matthew and asked him to meet in “about 45 to 50 minutes” at a food court in a shopping mall for the closing. Matthew asked Larson if his wife needed to be present. Larson said no. Matthew attempted to call Jamie anyway because she handled the couple’s finances and was employed as a loan originator for a mortgage banker. He was unable to reach Jamie and attended the closing alone with Larson.[1]

At the closing, which Matthew described as “rushed,” Larson had Matthew sign a large packet of documents. Included in that packet were two uniform residential loan applications. One application appears to have been generated by One Source Mortgage while the other was apparently generated by Citimortgage. Both loan applications identify Larson as the interviewer and indicate the application was taken by telephone. Matthew and Larson signed both applications at the closing on May 24, 2007.[2] The applications refer to Matthew as “unmarried” and as a “[s]ingle man.” Matthew also signed a promissory note in the amount of $320,228 at the May 24 closing. The note is payable to Citimortgage and secured by a purchase money mortgage on Matthew’s home. The mortgage, which contains a homestead exemption waiver clause, identifies the borrower as “Matthew D. Danielson, a single man.”

Matthew, Jamie, and their son have resided in the house since the closing. They failed, however, to make payments on the mortgage. Citimortgage consequently initiated foreclosure proceedings in December 2007 against Matthew. Matthew filed an answer and raised Citimortgage’s failure to secure Jamie’s signature on the mortgage as required by Iowa Code section 561.13 as an affirmative defense. Citimortgage amended its petition to add Jamie as a defendant. The Danielsons then filed a counterclaim to quiet title to the property, seeking an order from the court that Matthew’s mortgage with Citimortgage is void under section 561.13.

The district court denied summary judgment motions filed by Citimortgage and the Danielsons, and the matter proceeded to trial before the court. At the close of the evidence, the court ruled from the bench that the mortgage was void under section 561.13 and denied Citimortgage’s claim that Matthew fraudulently misrepresented his marital status. Citimortgage appeals.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

“Review of an equitable claim to foreclose a mortgage is de novo.” Iowa State Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel, 683 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Iowa 2004). We give weight to the fact findings of the district court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).

III. Discussion.

“Homestead rights are jealously guarded by the law.” Michel, 683 N.W.2d at 101; see also Merchants Mut. Bonding Co. v. Underberg, 291 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Iowa 1980) (“Homestead laws are creatures of public policy, designed to promote the stability and welfare of the state by preserving a home where the family may be sheltered and live beyond the reach of economic misfortune.”). One way in which the legislature has sought to protect homesteads is through Iowa Code section 561.13, which invalidates encumbrances of the homestead not signed by both spouses “unless and until the spouse of the owner executes the same or a like instrument.” See Thayer v. Sherman, 218 Iowa 451, 458, 255 N.W. 506, 509 (1934) (“The provisions of this section are for the benefit of all who are interested in the homestead. It is designed as a protection to the wife, the children, and the husband himself.”). If section 561.13 is not satisfied, the transaction is invalid as to both the husband and the wife. See Martin v. Martin, 720 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Iowa 2006)Beal Bank v. Siems, 670 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Iowa 2003) (holding mortgage on homestead void because not signed by owner’s spouse as required by section 561.13). (finding deed attempting to convey a homestead invalid where it was not signed by the owner’s spouse);

Section 561.13 was not satisfied in this case because the mortgage encumbering the parties’ homestead was signed only by Matthew, who was married to Jamie at the time of the encumbrance. The mortgage is therefore invalid and void as to both Matthew and Jamie. See Martin, 720 N.W.2d at 738 (emphasizing section 561.13 makes a conveyance or encumbrance of the homestead “invalid—that is, void—without the signature of both spouses, not merely voidable by the spouse who did not sign”).

Citimortgage attempts to avoid the harsh effect of section 561.13 in this case by asserting Matthew procured the mortgage by fraudulently misrepresenting his marital status, which it contends should result in the imposition of an equitable mortgage. The district court denied this claim, finding there was “not one piece of evidence to indicate Mr. Danielson knowingly or with any intent to defraud gave false information to anyone throughout this transaction.” Citimortgage claims the district court erred in so concluding.[3] We do not agree.

Our supreme court has recognized in “other circumstances that `courts of equity are bound by statutes and follow the law in [the] absence of fraud or mistake.’” Michel, 683 N.W.2d at 107 (quoting Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa 1987)). It is a well-settled principle of equity that misrepresentations amounting to fraud in the inducement of a contract, whether innocent or not, give rise to a right of avoidance on the part of the defrauded party. First Nat’l Bank v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1970). Here, however, Citimortgage attempts to use the Danielsons’ supposed fraud in procuring their mortgage to enforce that mortgage rather than avoid it. In any event, to prevail on such a claim, Citimortgage must prove “(1) a representation, (2) falsity, (3) materiality, (4) an intent to induce the other to act or refrain from acting, and (5) justifiable reliance.” City of Ottumwa v. Poole, 687 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 2004). We believe this case fails on the last two elements.

The evidence presented at trial establishes, as the district court found, that “everyone involved who actually had a role in this actual transaction . . . knew that Mr. Danielson was married.” Matthew and Jamie toured the home together with their real estate agent, the builder, and the builder’s real estate agent before Matthew agreed to purchase it. They also met with those individuals on several other occasions to discuss matters related to the purchase of the home. The warranty deed prepared by the attorney for the builder’s real estate agent originally referred to Matthew as “a married person,” though someone later changed that deed to identify him as “an unmarried person.” Matthew, whom the district court found to be credible, see Iowa R. App. 6.14(6)(g) (stating we give weight to the district court’s credibility determinations in equity cases), testified that Larson “absolutely” knew he was married. He specifically asked Larson before the closing if his wife needed to be present, and Larson said no. Matthew nevertheless attempted to contact her on his way to the closing. In light of the foregoing, we do not believe the record reveals any intent on Matthew’s part to induce Citimortgage to act on the basis of the representations in the closing documents regarding his marital status.

Indeed, it appears Citimortgage approved Matthew for the loan before receiving a signed copy of his loan application. Matthew did not sign the loan applications prepared by Larson until the closing on May 24, 2007. Yet Citimortgage issued a commitment letter to Matthew on May 16 advising him that his application for a mortgage had been approved. No evidence was presented as to what information Citimortgage relied on in approving the loan to Matthew and preparing the mortgage that identified him as a “single man.” We cannot see how Citimortgage could have justifiably relied on the representations contained in the loan applications and the mortgage itself regarding Matthew’s marital status in agreeing to loan him $320,228 on May 16 when those documents were not executed until May 24. See Lockard v. Carson, 287 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Iowa 1980) (stating the recipient of a fraudulent representation cannot recover “if he blindly relies on a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be patent to him if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination or investigation”). Finally, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that Matthew fraudulently induced Citimortgage to enter into the mortgage by representing that he was not married, there is no evidence present in the record from which we could conclude that Jamie had any part in that supposed fraud.

It is clear from our review of cases applying section 561.13 that the statute is intended to protect “the whole family unit.” Martin, 720 N.W.2d at 736, 739 (“If the statute is not satisfied, the deed is invalid as to both the husband and the wife.”); see also Beal Bank, 670 N.W.2d at 124 (voiding mortgage in favor of spouse whose signature was omitted); Hostetler v. Eddy, 128 Iowa 401, 406, 104 N.W. 485, 487 (1905) (holding contract not signed by wife “was void in favor of both husband and wife”). As we alluded to earlier, “[o]ur law has chosen to provide special procedures to protect homestead rights, and has defined this protection in a comprehensive manner.” Martin, 720 N.W.2d at 738.

[T]he purpose of the homestead laws is to provide a margin of safety to the family, not only for the benefit of the family, but for the public welfare and social benefit which accrues to the State by having families secure in their homes.

Id. (citation omitted). We therefore construe homestead laws “broadly and liberally” in favor of the beneficiaries of the legislation, which include “the wife, the children, and the husband himself,” Thayer, 218 Iowa at 458, 255 N.W. at 509,See Martin, 720 N.W.2d at 738. to secure its benevolent purposes.

While it may be tempting for courts to fashion remedies deemed to be fair and just under the particular circumstances of a case, “the law has defined those concepts and must dominate the decision making process.” Id. “[I]t is not for courts to overlook the language of a statute to reach a particular result deemed unjust under the particular circumstances of a case.” Id. “This rule protects the integrity of the legislature’s judgment that certain transactions will be given effect only if they comply with the requirements set out in the statute.” Michel, 683 N.W.2d at 107 (refusing to apply equitable mortgage where bank did not comply with the disclosure requirements of section 561.22 even though debtors knew they were mortgaging their homestead); see also Thayer, 218 Iowa at 458, 255 N.W. at 509 (“The homestead right is created by statute, and this can only be alienated in the manner provided by statute.”). We are thus bound to apply section 561.13 to invalidate the mortgage in this case as it did not contain the signatures of both spouses and Citimortgage did not establish any fraud on the part of either spouse in obtaining the mortgage. See Michel, 683 N.W.2d at 109 n.6 (“[A] creditor is bound by statutory requirements in the absence of fraud or mistake.”).[4]

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude the mortgage was entered into while Matthew was married, and his wife did not execute the same or a like instrument joining in the encumbrance. It was therefore void under Iowa Code section 561.13. Citimortgage has not established any fraud on the part of either spouse that would avoid the effect of section 561.13. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Citimortgage’s petition to foreclose its mortgage on the property and declaring that mortgage to be void under section 561.13.

AFFIRMED.


[1] It appears Larson handled the closing himself. Pulliam testified that he had no recollection of the closing or Matthew. Matthew likewise testified that he had never met Pulliam prior to the trial and that Larson had conducted the closing on his own.

[2] Although Larson’s signature appears on both loan applications, Pulliam testified that he actually signed Larson’s name for him on the Citimortgage loan application as indicated by Pulliam’s initials that appear after Larson’s name.

[3] Citimortgage raises a variety of alternative theories on appeal seeking to preclude the application of section 561.13, including mutual mistake, equitable estoppel, and ratification. It additionally challenges the status of the property as a homestead at the time the property was encumbered, arguing,

With . . . a purchase money mortgage, the party that is purchasing the property is not using the property as a homestead at the time that the mortgage is executed, because the purchase money mortgage is necessary for the party to acquire the initial ownership in the property.

Although it appears some of these theories were raised in the district court proceedings, the only issue decided by the district court was Citimortgage’s claim of fraud. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). “When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.” Id. No such motion was filed in this case. We therefore confine our analysis to Citimortgage’s claim of fraud.

[4] We note, as did the court in Michel, that our decision does not leave Citimortgage without remedies. See Michel, 683 N.W.2d at 107 n.5 (observing the bank could pursue a personal judgment against the debtors).

9-194 w
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Sunday, February 20, 2011

Thursday, February 3, 2011

DOES WELLS FARGO PRINT THEIR OWN STATUTES? PUBLISH THEIR OWN LEGAL DICTIONARY?

Iowa State Capitol in Des Moines, Iowa, after ...Image via Wikipedia
Tom Miller's Iowa State Capitol
LISTEN TO FRANKIELEE! CALL YOUR ATTORNEY GENERAL TODAY!  THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL NEED TO "STIFFEN THEIR COLLECTIVE SPINES."  SO TRUE.  IF THESE SERVERS ACTIONS AREN'T CRIMINAL, TOM MILLER, WHAT IS?

WHEN A WELLS FARGO EMPLOYEE TAKES BILLIONS, WELLS FARGO SCREAMS "CRIMINAL!"   WHEN MONEY IS STOLEN FROM WELLS FARGO'S BANKS, WELLS FARGO SCREAMS "CRIMINALS!"  

SO WHY IS IT NOT CRIMINAL WHEN WELLS FARGO TAKES CUSTOMER'S MONEY, STEALS INVESTOR'S FUNDS, AND KICKS HOMEOWNERS INTO THE STREETS?   

LISTEN TO FRANKIELEE
Call Your Attorney General, February 3, to Call For Tough Penalties for Foreclosure Fraud

A number of national consumer groups are organizing calls to state attorney generals to stiffen their collective spines. As you may recall, the 50 state attorney general investigation into mortgage and foreclosure abuses started with the usual fanfare and promises of tough action and has been trying to beat a quiet retreat since them.

The AG leading the probe, Tom Miller of Iowa, made a public promise in December to put bank executives in jail for the crimes they’ve committed against the American people. Last week, he backtracked almost completely, and is now claiming the matter "is inherently civil, not criminal."  The laws certainly haven’t changed since last year, only the party line has.

You can find your AG’s # here:

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