Showing posts with label Sheila Bair. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sheila Bair. Show all posts

Monday, July 25, 2011

CRIMINAL CHARGES WILL BE FILED AGAINST WELLS FARGO IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE

OP-ED COLUMNIST

This Is Considered Punishment?

Last Wednesday, nearly lost in the furor over Rupert-gate and the debt ceiling crisis, came the surprising news that the Federal Reserve has issued a cease-and-desist order against a Too-Big-to-Fail bank. The bank was Wells Fargo, which was also fined $85 million and ordered to compensate customers it had unfairly — indeed, illegally — taken advantage of during the subprime bubble.
Earl Wilson/The New York Times
Joe Nocera

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What made the news surprising, of course, was that the Federal Reserve has rarely, if ever, taken action against a bank for making predatory loans. Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman, didn’t believe in regulation and turned a blind eye to subprime abuses. His successor, Ben Bernanke, is not the ideologue that Greenspan is, but, as an institution, the Fed prefers to coddle banks rather than punish them. That the Fed would crack down on Wells Fargo would seem to suggest a long-overdue awakening.
Yet, for anyone still hoping for justice in the wake of the financial crisis, the news was hardly encouraging. First, the Fed did not force Wells Fargo to admit guilt — and even let the company issue a press release blaming its wrongdoing on a “relatively small group.” The $85 million fine was a joke; in just the last quarter, Wells Fargo’s revenues exceeded $20 billion. And compensating borrowers isn’t going to hurt much either. By my calculation, it won’t top $20 million.
Most upsetting of all, the settlement raises the question that just won’t go away: Why can’t the federal government prosecute financial wrongdoers?
I realize that the Federal Reserve can’t bring a criminal case (and, to be fair, there are statutory limits on how big a fine it can levy). But the Justice Department certainly can. Yet ever since it lost an early case against two Bear Stearns fund managers in 2009, it has gone after only the smallest of small fry: individual borrowers, brokers and appraisers who lack the means to do much more than plead guilty.
In March, for instance, I wrote about the sad case of Charlie Engle, the ultra-marathoner, who was convicted of lying on a liar loan — that is, exaggerating his income on a subprime mortgage application — even though the evidence against him was thin. Prosecuted by Neil H. MacBride, the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, Engle was sentenced to 21 months in prison.
Now compare Engle’s alleged crime to the case the Federal Reserve brought against Wells Fargo Financial, which, until it was shut down last summer, was the subprime subsidiary of Wells Fargo, based in Des Moines. There were several allegations, but the one that caught my eye was that Wells employees “falsified income information on mortgage applications.” In other words, they lied on liar loans! The only difference is that the lying was done by a group of Wells Fargo brokers rather than by some poor sap like Charlie Engle.
What’s more, this practice appears to have been quite widespread — “fostered,” as the Fed puts it, “by Wells Fargo Financial’s incentive compensation and sales quota programs.” Matthew R. Lee, the executive director of Inner City Press/Community on the Move and Fair Finance Watch, spent years bringing Wells’ subprime abuses to the attention of the Federal Reserve. “The way the compensation was designed insured that abuses would take place,” he says. “It was a predatory system.”
These are exactly the kind of loans — built on illegal practices — that gave us the financial crisis. Brokers working for subprime mortgage companies routinely doctored incomes to hand out subprime loans they knew the borrowers could never repay — and then, after taking their fat fees, shoveled the loans to Wall Street, which bundled them into subprime securities. This was the kindling that lit the inferno of September 2008. So again, I ask: Why is there no criminal investigation into what went on at Wells Fargo Financial?
The person I called for answers was the press secretary to Nicholas A. Klinefeldt, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of Iowa, which includes Des Moines. A glance at Klinefeldt’s 2011 press releases suggests that he takes the MacBride approach to mortgage fraud: only the little guy has anything to fear. Needless to say, his press secretary knew nothing about the Wells Fargo case and even questioned whether the Southern District of Iowa had jurisdiction.
The next day, he referred me to a Justice Department spokeswoman. I wrote her an e-mail laying out my question as plainly as I could: “I am trying to understand why the mortgage brokers who work at a major bank are getting a pass when they have lied on liar loans,” I said.
That was Friday. On Monday, at 8:30 p.m., a half-hour from press time, the Justice Department sent me a statement claiming that in 2010 “the number of defendants in mortgage fraud cases more than doubled” from 2009.
Not one of those defendants ever worked for Wells Fargo Financial.

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Friday, July 22, 2011

BEHIND THE CORNER-CUTTING, VAST TROVES OF MISSING DOCUMENTS

BEHIND THE CORNER-CUTTING,
VAST TROVES OF MISSING DOCUMENTS


WHY HAVE SKETCHY MORTGAGE procedures been so difficult to root out?  some lawyers blame misguided efforts to cut costs. Most foreclosures are uncontested, they note. And so servicers save money by avoiding costly searches for missing original documents or hiring additional staff to deal with the surge in
foreclosures.  There are signs, however, that servicers resort to doubtful documents because they have no choice if they are determined to foreclose:  to a great extent, originals simply don’t exist.  It’s one of the overlooked legacies of the housing boom.

In the rush to make new home loans and sell them off as fast as possible to investors on Wall  street, the original lenders --big banks as well as now defunct makers of subprime loans -- destroyed original
documents, or never turned them over as required to the ownership pools that scooped them up. From 2004 through the end of the housing boom in 2006, more than half of all new mortgages were securitized and sold to such pools, known as mortgage-securitization trusts, according to the  securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association.

So, banks and intermediaries in many cases never turned over the two essential documents underpinning a home loan -- promissory notes and mortgages -- that would convey ownership to the investor trusts.  that means many pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds that invested in the trusts never got formal title to mortgages they had paid for.

One example: Public records in foreclosure cases indicate that New century Mortgage, the nation’s second largest subprime lender until it collapsed in 2007, almost never endorsed promissory notes or assigned mortgages to trusts that bought its mortgages. A Reuters sampling of 50 foreclosure cases filed in Duval  County, Florida, involving New  century mortgages found that none of the promissory notes filed in the cases had any endorsements at all on them. Records show that similar large-scale lapses occurred with other big
lenders.  The result is that trusts may be out many billions of dollars, says Matthew Weidner, a lawyer who specializes in mortgage litigation.  If proper procedures are followed now, foreclosures could slow to a trickle. 

And a cloud would hang over title to millions of homes, potentially further depressing the housing market.  Sheila Bair, who recently stepped down as Federal deposit Insurance corp. chairman, in Congressional testimony has called for a wide-ranging audit of the problem.  But other regulators so far haven’t backed the
idea, possibly fearing the consequences if the extent of the problem became known.

(Editing by Michael Williams)

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Sunday, April 17, 2011

LYNN E. SZYMONIAK, ESQ., HER ENDLESS EFFORTS FOR HOMEOWNERS

Open Letter To FDIC Chair 
Sheila Bair From Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq.

April 16, 2011

Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman, FDIC
550 17th Street, NW, Room 6028
Washington, D.C. 20429

Re: Fixed-Rate, Low-Rate Mortgages As An Element of Compensation for Foreclosure Fraud 

Dear Chairwoman Bair:

I write to you regarding fraud by banks in foreclosures. I previously wrote to you in January, 2010, regarding massive foreclosure fraud.

I am the woman who was featured on the 60 Minutes segment on April 3, 2011 on foreclosure fraud. That segment brought the wrath of Deutsche Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing down upon me, but I have no regrets. You were also interviewed by Scott Pelley in this segment.

One proposal you recommend for holding the banks accountable for frauds and abuses in foreclosures is to create a fund to make reparations to victims. I support such a fund. An inquiry into whether the victims have been compensated is a traditional part of white collar criminal law. Such compensation is not made, of course, in place of criminal sanctions, but as an important part of such sanctions.

The fraud is so pervasive that twenty or thirty billion dollars will not begin to compensate the victims, and the banks certainly know this, even as they are setting aside as little as one to two billion for such relief.

I am writing to suggest to you that real compensation will include the opportunity for victims to have another mortgage.

Many victims of foreclosure fraud have been left with ruined finances, no credit and deficiency judgments. A one-time cash payout will not repair this damage.

The banks need to be required to offer victims of foreclosure fraud fixed rate, low-rate (3% – 4%) traditional 30-year mortgages, with a 5% down payment.

Such relief should be offered in every case where the lenders have filed forged and fabricated documents in official county records and court cases.

This relief should also be offered wherever a mortgage payment was incorrectly “adjusted” by mortgage servicers, including the tens of thousands of cases where the servicers attempted to justify their actions as a permitted increase in the escrow fund for taxes or insurance.

Such relief should also be offered wherever banks foreclosed while telling homeowners they were considering their eligibility for HAMP.

Such relief should also be offered wherever banks “lost” the homeowners’ HAMP applications and supporting documents three or more times.

Many victims of foreclosure fraud sold their homes, often at a loss, to avoid foreclosure. These victims also need to be compensated. These homeowners were very regularly told that mortgage-backed trusts owned their mortgages and would foreclose, even as the bank trustees knew that the documents demonstrating such ownership, the properly endorsed notes and assigned mortgages, were never held by the trusts.

Not every victim would choose another mortgage because many individuals will never trust another bank. There will, however, be tens of thousands of victims who are willing to become homeowners again.

Communities with a 40% rate of abandoned, vacant homes would benefit from such relief. County and state budgets would also benefit.

Please consider mortgage availability as an integral part of any plan to compensate victims of foreclosure fraud.

Please call upon me if I can be of assistance.

Yours truly,
 Lynn E. Szymoniak, Esq. (szymoniak@mac.com)
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